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Given that an increasing share of firms’ borrowing occurs through bondmarkets, we
study how debt structure affect the transmission of monetary policy. We present a high-
frequency framework that combines identified monetary shocks with cross-sectional
firm-level stock price reaction. An envelope argument shows that firm-level stock mar-
ket data is particularly informative: since firms maximize equity value subject to con-
straints, stock price reactions directly reflect how monetary policy affects constraints
in the population of firms once we control for equity duration. We apply this idea to
a sample of US and Eurozone public firms in 2001-07. In Europe, contrary to classi-
cal bank lending channel predictions, firms with more bank debt are less affected by
surprise monetary tightening relative to other firms. On the other hand, we find no
differential effect in the United States. We stress the role of firm liquidity management
and difference in financial systems to explain these findings.
Keywords: Monetary policy, debt structure, stock market, banking relationships, cor-
porate bonds
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1 Introduction
Most macroeconomic aggregates—such as investment, output or employment—are de-
termined by firm decisions and influenced by monetary policy. Given that changes to
the policy rate directly affect the cost of external financing, it is plausible that firms’ debt
play an important role.1 A (multiform) "bank lending channel" is the pre-dominant view
to understand the financial transmission of monetary policy. However, bond debt has
been rising at the expense of bank lending in recent years. Europe is a striking example
of this rapid growth: although its bond markets were historically less developed than in
the U.S., according to the European Commission, the share of market financing almost
doubled between 2000 and 2016. How does monetary transmission depend on the bond-
bank share? This is an open and consequential issue—indeed, the stock of bond debt has
become a major concern for central bankers.2
Addressing this question presents two challenges. On the empirical front, cleanly
identifying the effect of monetary policy is hindered by the fact that policy decisions are
endogenous and correlated with many drivers of firm choices. While high-frequency
approaches have been remarkably successful in isolating monetary shocks (Nakamura
and Steinsson, 2018b), tracing the impact of these shocks on the real economy has proven
more difficult. Second, the conceptual front is equally challenging. While bank loans,
unlike bonds, are provided by levered intermediaries with significant liquidity mismatch,
there are others channels for which the difference between bonds and loans can matter
for monetary transmission. For instance, the corporate finance literature emphasizes that
market debt is more rigid and harder to renegotiate relative to bank loans, or "relationship
financing" (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). They also tend to have different contractual
characteristics, such as maturity, interest rate fixation, or seniority among others.
To address these challenges, this paper presents a high-frequency approach that com-
bines identified monetary shocks with cross-sectional firm-level stock price reaction. An
1Indeed, a growing number of papers have emphasized the role of firm liabilities in shaping the response
of the economy to aggregate shocks (Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina (2012), Giroud and Mueller
(2017), Crouzet (2017), Gomes, Jermann, and Schmid (2016) or Ottonello and Winberry (2018)).
2The January 2019 minutes of the FOMC state that "the build-up in overall nonfinancial business debt to
levels close to historical highs relative to GDP was viewed as a factor that could amplify adverse shocks to
the business sector." The President of the Federal Reserve of Dallas recently claimed: "As a central banker,
I am carefully tracking the growth in BBB and less-than-investment-grade debt. In a downturn, some
proportion of BBB bonds maybe at risk of being downgraded, creating dislocations."
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envelope argument shows that stock market data is special: since firms maximize equity
value subject to constraints, stock price reactions directly reflect how monetary policy
affects constraints in the population of firms once we control for equity duration. We
provide an unifying framework of debt structure and monetary transmission and apply
our empirical strategy to a sample of Eurozone and U.S. public firms. In Europe, con-
trary to standard bank lending channel predictions, firms with more bank debt are less
affected by surprise monetary tightening relative to other firms. This is consistent with
the value of banking relationships: since bonds are harder to renegotiate in bad times
than loans, rate hikes tighten liquidity constraints relatively more for bond-reliant firms.
On the other hand, we find no differential effect in the United States. This is consistent
with well-developed bondmarkets and rating agencies, leading to a low value of banking
relationships for large U.S. firms.
The first part of the paper explains how to interpret stock market reactions in order
to learn about the effect of monetary policy on firms. We first highlight a very general
envelope argument: to a first order, since firms maximize equity value subject to con-
straints, their stock price reaction is not driven by change in optimal firm’s policies. In-
stead, it reveals how monetary policy affects the constraints faced by the firm, as well
as a direct equity duration effect. Leaning on recent developments in the asset pricing
literature to control for equity duration (Gormsen and Lazarus, 2019; Weber, 2018), this
suggests a clean high-frequency approach to estimate how monetary policy tightens or
relaxes financial constraints, a force at the heart of recent macro-finance models of mon-
etary transmission. We then specialize this approach to study how differences between
bonds and bank loans matters for monetary transmission. Our organizing framework
nests three general forces. First, bonds and loans have different maturity and interest rate
fixation (Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive, 2018), which will be subsumed in our equity
duration controls. Second, the (multiform) bank lending channels suggest that higher
rates reduce loan supply.3 This would imply that more bank financing tightens constraints
after a rate hike. Third, bonds are harder to renegotiate in bad times and banking relation-
ships provide insurance against temporary shocks (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Crouzet,
3Because banks are levered intermediaries issuing liquid deposits to fund illiquid loans, they are poten-
tially affected by monetary policy in specific ways. Classical views stress the role of reserves and capital,
whereas more recent theories emphasize market power (Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2017), the compo-
sition of bank interest income (Wang, 2018) or interest coverage covenants (Greenwald, 2019).
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2017; Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli, 2016; De Fiore and Uhlig, 2015). In that
case, more bank financing relaxes constraints after a rate hike. In general, the effect of debt
structure is ambiguous: our empirical estimates will determine which force dominates in
a specific sample.4
In the second part of the paper, we apply this approach to two samples of public firms
in the Eurozone and the United States. We construct a panel that combines information
on policy announcements, asset prices, firm balance sheets and financing structure. We
focus on conventional monetary policy between 2001 and 2007, from the early years of the
Euro to the beginning of the financial crisis. In the Eurozone, we follow Corsetti, Duarte,
and Mann (2018) and construct identified monetary policy shocks using quasi-intraday
data on interest swaps. In the United States, we use the time series of shocks constructed
by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a). These shocks capture the surprise content of cen-
tral banks’ announcements and are hence little affected by general macro-economic in-
formation that did not fall on that specific time window of the day. Daily stock prices
are merged with balance sheet information as well as comprehensive corporate bond is-
suance data to measure the reliance of firms on bond financing.
We find contrasting results across the two samples. In the Eurozone, there is strong
evidence that debt composition matters for the transmission of monetary policy: firms
with more bond debt are relatively more affected by surprise interest rate changes. This
finding holds true when we control for total debt and sector-specific sensitivities to mon-
etary policy.5 Quantitatively, after 25 basis point increase in interest rates, firms in the
bottom quartile of the bonds over assets distribution have a 50 basis point lower stock
return relative to firms in the top quartile.6 A number of robustness tests confirm this
fact, including the inclusion of traditional balance sheet covariates that are thought to
drive bond financing or the response to monetary policy. This finding is hard to square
with a (multiform) bank lending channel. Irrespective of the exact micro-foundation, this
type of explanation would imply that bond-reliant firms are relatively less responsive,
4Naturally, the distinction between these broad forces is not always clear cut. For instance, the channel
in Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito, and Perez-Orive (2018) suggests that liquidity insurance offered by banks
can be impaired if their balance sheet is negatively affected by monetary tightening.
5A number of potential transmission channels of monetary policy can affect firms indirectly, indepen-
dently of their liabilities. Important examples include changes to consumer demand or labor supply. How-
ever, it is likely that those channels operate mainly at the sectoral level and are netted out in a within-sector,
across-firm specification.
6The sample standard deviation of stock returns on monetary announcement days is 2.5%.
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the opposite of what the data suggest. On the other hand, the evidence is consistent with
banking relationships providing insurance against temporary shocks, and thus that more
bond financing tightens constraints after a rate hike.
However, we find no difference in the United States across firms with different debt
structure, once we control for equity duration.7 This suggests that banking relationships
do not relax liquidity constraints for U.S. firms. In fact, this striking difference across
regions can plausibly be rationalized by sharp differences between these two financial
systems. Indeed, a number of stylized facts suggest that the value-added of banking
relationships relative to market financing is much lower in the United States compared
to the Eurozone. For instance, the prevalence of ratings agencies and public information
is significantly different: the ECB estimates that in 2004 only 11% of firms with turnover
over e50M had an S&P rating in Europe, compared to 92% in the U.S. We also show that
rating downgrades have a stronger effect for Eurozone firms. Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito,
and Perez-Orive (2018) show that U.S. firms with more bonds get liquidity insurance
not from a relationship bank, but by signing credit line agreements that are frequently
undrawn. Finally, Darmouni (2019) finds little evidence of private information embedded
in banking relationships for large U.S. firms.
The chief implication of our findings is that macroeconomic models would benefit
from featuring heterogeneity in debt structure more prominently, and, in particular, the
mix of bonds and bank loans. Sources of external financing are not perfect substitutes
and the underlying tradeoffs affect the pass-through of monetary policy. Meanwhile,
debt structure is driven by past financing patterns, which are in turn determined by past
policies. This implies a path-dependence to the actions of central banks: episodes of
quantitative easing and low interest rates bring about a larger reliance on corporate bond
financing, a trend that influences how conventional monetary policy operates going for-
ward.
Related literature
This paper builds on an extensive body of works at the intersection of corporate finance
and macroeconomics. First, it relates to the literature on the choice between bonds and
7This is line with the findings of Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2018).
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bank loans. Crouzet (2017), Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito, and Perez-Orive (2018) and
Crouzet (2014) show that the optimal mix of bonds versus loans varies in the cross-section
of firms and that this fact has implications for real outcomes. Crouzet andMehrotra (2017)
find that U.S. bond issuers are more sensitive to recessions. De Fiore and Uhlig (2015,
2011) also study the choice of debt type in a macroeconomic context and show that it
played a role in Europe during the financial crisis. We emphasize the role of bond debt
rigidity, following classical theoretical (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Diamond, 1991; Ra-
jan, 1992) and empirical contributions. We further complement papers that show how
policies stimulating bond markets can have aggregate effects through the substitution of
bank loans toward bonds (Balloch, 2018; Grosse-Rueschkamp, Steffen, and Streitz, 2019;
Arce, Gimeno, andMayordomo, 2018). Kashyap, Stein, andWilcox (1996) and Bolton and
Freixas (2006) suggest that monetary policy pass-through depends on the composition of
external finance, although the mechanism is very different. Lhuissier and Szczerbowicz
(2018) and Becker and Ivashina (2014) provide evidence on monetary policy influencing
firms’ choice of debt structure.
We also relate to an extensive literature on corporate liquidity management (see
Almeida, Campello, Cunha, and Weisbach (2014) for a survey). In particular, we build
on recent work stressing the role of corporate finance and liquidity in monetary trans-
mission (Rocheteau, Wright, and Zhang, 2018; Acharya and Plantin, 2019; Kiyotaki and
Moore, 2018; Cloyne, Ferreira, Froemel, and Surico, 2018). Our paper is also related to the
literature on the bank lending channel of monetary policy (Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl,
2017; Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina, 2012; Wang, 2018;
Wang, Whited, Wu, and Xiao, 2018).
In terms of its approach, this paper relies on high-frequency identification of mone-
tary policy shocks (Cook and Hahn, 1989; Kuttner, 2001; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002;
Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005a; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018a; Corsetti, Duarte, and
Mann, 2018). The most related work in this area describes heterogeneous reactions of
stocks to high-frequency monetary shocks based on a broad set of balance sheet charac-
teristics (Ozdagli (2018), Ozdagli and Velikov (2019) and Haitsma, Unalmis, and de Haan
(2016)), while Andreson and Cesa-Bianchi (2018) studies the response of credit spreads.
In contrast, we focus on the role of bond financing.
In terms of its findings, this paper aligns with the growing consensus that heterogene-
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ity is key to monetary policy transmission. For instance, Ottonello and Winberry (2018),
Jeenas (2018) and (Lakdawala andMoreland, 2019) emphasize heterogeneous response of
firmswith different financial positions. Gomes, Jermann, and Schmid (2016) andDe Fiore,
Teles, and Tristani (2011) present macroeconomic models of monetary policy with a focus
on firms’ external financing. Greenwald (2019) describes a covenant channel of monetary
transmission. Rodnyansky (2019) investigates how firm heterogeneity together with in-
termediate import intensities mediate the monetary transmission process in unorthodox
ways. Auclert (2019), Wong (2019), Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018), Coibion, Gorod-
nichenko, Kueng, and Silvia (2017) also highlight the importance of heterogeneity, with a
stronger focus on the household sector.
2 High-Frequency Approach
2.1 Envelope Argument: Information in Stock Price Reaction
This section offers a general illustration of the envelope argument that will guide our em-
pirical strategy. We argue that stock price data is special. Not only it is available at high-
frequency to help identification, it is also particularly revealing because it is related to
the objective function of firms. Given firms maximize equity value subject to constraints,
stock price reactions have a clear interpretation given by the envelope theorem.
To fix ideas, consider a setting that potentially fits manymacro-financemodels of firms
facing financial constraints. The firm has a vector of characteristics x and denote the
monetary policy target by rf . The firm chooses its optimal policies y∗ = (I∗, N∗, D∗...)
for path of inputs, debt, etc. These policies are chosen to maximise the present value of
future expected profits E(y, x, rf ) = Σt
pit(y,x)
(1+rt)t
. In addition, the firm is subject to a number
K of constraints Gk(y, x, rf ) ≥ 0, which potentially depend on the policy rate rf . In this
setting, equity value is the value function:
V = max
y
E(y, x, rf ) s.t. Gk(y, x, rf ) ≥ 0∀k











∗, x, rf )
∂rf︸ ︷︷ ︸
how MP affects constraints
In particular, the change in optimal policy dy
∗
drf
induced bymonetary policy is second order.
Instead, the stock price reaction can be decomposed in two terms. The first is the direct
effect: the revaluation of the objective function induced by the shock, keeping the firm
policies constant. We label this direct term "equity duration", borrowing from the asset
pricing literature in which it denotes the interest-rate sensitivity of the present value of a
given cash flow stream. Recent works have argued that duration is an important driver
of the cross-section of stock returns (Gormsen and Lazarus, 2019; Weber, 2018) and we
will use their measures in our empirical analysis.
The second term is of particular interest to understand the monetary transmission
channel. It captures how monetary policy relaxes or tightens the constraints faced by
firms. This channel is absolutely central to macro-finance models with financial frictions.
Interestingly, our envelope argument shows that stock prices are directly informative about
this channel, once we control for equity duration. This is remarkable given that detecting
constraints empirically is generally thought to be especially difficult. Note that this idea
is quite general. It only relies on firms maximizing equity value and not on the type of
policies or constraints considered.
2.2 Cross-sectional Approach
Our empirical approach leverages this idea by combining time series and cross-sectional
high-frequency variation. Monetary policy shocks can be recovered from change in
market interest rates over short windows around policy announcements (Kuttner, 2001;
Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018a; Corsetti, Duarte, andMann, 2018). We then look at firm-
level stock market response to these shocks across firms.
We focus on the role of debt structure in monetary transmission and ask whether firms
with more bond financing respond differently to monetary policy. The envelope argu-
ment above shows that this cross-sectional stock market response reveals howMP affects
constraints differentially across firms with different debt structure.
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A few comments are in order. First, it is important to adequately control for equity du-
ration. Second, we can only detect constraints that are affected bymonetary policy. Third,
stock price reaction are, to a first order, not driven by changes in credit flows. Our results
are therefore complimentary to the extensive literature that has shown that monetary
policy drives bond and loan issuance differentially (Becker and Ivashina, 2014; Lhuissier
and Szczerbowicz, 2018). Finally, cross-sectional estimates can only capture constraints
for which debt structure matters. If monetary policy relaxes constraints uniformly across
firms with different debt structure, our estimate will be zero. The next two subsections
elaborate on this issues.
2.3 Bank vs. Bonds and Monetary Transmission
Since stock price reaction reveals how monetary policy tightens constraints, to interpret
our findings one needs to understand how debt structurematters for financial constraints.
Existing works have argued that bank loans and bonds are not perfect substitutes. In this
section, we aim to map out three broad types of differences across of bonds and loans
that are relevant for monetary transmission. The next subsection nests these forces into a
simple organizing framework.
Maturity and fixed vs. floating rates: Bonds and loans tend to have different maturity
and interest rate fixation. Corporate bonds tend to have longer maturities than bank
loans and are more likely to have fixed interest rates Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive
(2018). Note however that these differences are more pronounced in the United States
relative to Europe. In the Eurozone, bonds tend to have shorter maturities than their U.S.
counterparts, while the share of bank loans with floating rates is significantly smaller than
in the U.S.
The revaluation of debt (and assets) with respect to a change in interest rates is sum-
marized by its duration—the (percentage) change in net present value to a change in the
interest rate. The duration increases (becomes more negative) with longer maturity and
with fixed as opposed to variable coupon payments. In our setting, the present value of
bond repayments falls relatively more than for a loan, due to their longer maturity and
fixed interest rate as a consequence to a rise in the interest rate. Because debt is a liability
for the firm, this implies that, ceteris paribus, more bonds lead to smaller (less negative)
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equity duration. Intuitively, bonds are revalued significantly downward after a rate hike,
while the revaluation of loans is smaller.
Interest rate pass-through: Monetary policy affects the cost of credit for firms, both
through the risk-free rate as well as the risk premium (Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl,
2018; Kekre and Lenel, 2019). However, different debt instruments have different inter-
est rate pass-through to borrowers. This interest pass-through is at the core of existing
views of the (multiform) bank lending channel of monetary policy. Classical views em-
phasized the role of reserves or bank capital, while recent views have argued that banks’
market power, loan covenants or bank income composition are quantitatively important
(Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2017; Wang, Whited, Wu, and Xiao, 2018; Greenwald,
2019; Wang, 2018). The floating rate nature of bank loans also matters for this channel
Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2018), in addition to affecting equity duration. In-
dependent of their exact micro-foundations, these theories rely on bank-related frictions
and suggest that bonds have a lower interest rate pass-through relative to loans.
Corporate liquidity management: The third force is motivated by extensive work in
corporate finance that stresses the importance of firms’ liquidity management: invest-
ment, debt and cash hoarding policies are jointly determined in a forward-looking man-
ner to avoid financial distress. When capital markets are not frictionless, firms have in-
centives to self-insure against temporary cash-flow shocks by holding liquid assets. Cor-
porate liquidity has been recently recognized a key force for monetary transmission (Ro-
cheteau, Wright, and Zhang, 2018; Kiyotaki andMoore, 2018; Altavilla, Burlon, Giannetti,
and Holton, 2019).
Through this channel, debt structure can affect monetary transmission in a novel way.
Indeed, an equally large body of work emphasizes the distinction between relationship
banking and market financing. A key aspect of this difference is that bonds tend to be
widely held by a dispersed base of investors, which make them harder to renegotiate
(Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). On the other hand, in bad times banks are better able to
help their relationship borrowers avoid financial distress (Crouzet, 2017; Bolton, Freixas,
Gambacorta, and Mistrulli, 2016; De Fiore and Uhlig, 2015). Debt structure thus alters
firm liquidity management in normal times. A rate hike drains future cash-flow and,
ceteris paribus, tightens liquidity constraints relatively more for firms with more bonds.
The discussion makes clear that the effect of debt structure on monetary transmission
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is ambiguous. While the first two forces predict that firmswithmore bank loans should be
relatively more affected by monetary shocks, the third force predicts the opposite effect.
Which force dominates is likely driven by the relative strength of the different frictions
faced by firms in the environment in which they operate. Our empirical results will shed
light on this question, and compare the Eurozone with the United States, two regions
with very different financial systems.
2.4 Organizing Framework
To fix ideas, this section presents a simple model that nests the three forces above in a
coherent framework. The goal is not to present the most general model but to illustrate
what is revealed by stock price reactions. We apply our envelope argument in this set-
ting to illustrate how debt structure matters for monetary transmission. We model firms
with debt in place that face potential temporary cash-flow shocks. Financial frictions im-
ply that firms have to jointly manage their investment and liquidity holdings. To keep
exposition short, we do not endogenize all margins.8
Setup: A firm has a legacy project (assets in place) that pays cash flows in each pe-
riod, as well as debt obligations that must be paid in each period. We model three dates
explicitly: t=0, 1 and 2. Figure 1 illustrates the timeline. The last period t=2 summarizes
all future cash-flows. The existing assets in place generate a payoff stream for the firm
with present value PV E0 = PV A0−PV D0, which is the difference between the all future
cash-flows and debt service payments. We allow the structure of these payoff streams to
be arbitrary, and their duration (how their present value changes with discount rates) is
the only summary statistics needed for the analysis below. At t=0, the firm has a new
investment opportunity. This new project generates a stream of cash-flows starting from
t=2. An amount I invested at t=0 generates a present value of R(I)PV I at t=2. Assume
decreasing returns to scale, so that R is increasing and concave. The term PV I summa-
rizes the temporal structure of the cash-flows and captures the new project duration, that
plays an important role in the analysis.9
8For instance, the model could be extended in the line of Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito, and Perez-Orive
(2018) to account for the joint choice of debt structure and liquidity instruments. We also abstract from
payouts (Acharya and Plantin, 2019) and maturity choice for simplicity.
9For example, if the project pays a first cash-flow R(I) that grows a rate g every period and the discount
rate is ρ, R(I)PV I = R(I)/(ρ− g).
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Liquidity shock: Following Holmström and Tirole (1998), we model liquidity shocks
at the interim period t=1. The source of the liquidity shock is that temporary cash-flow at
t=1 are uncertain: π1 can be unexpectedly low, without any implication for terminal cash-
flows. The firm faces a credit event if at t=1 its current financial resources are too small
relative to current debt service payments10. For simplicity, assume that the firm is liqui-
dated with zero recovery value in case of a credit event. More generally, the framework
is well suited to understand how firms manage their credit rating or plan in advance to
prevent covenant violations, over and above avoiding conventional defaults.
Corporate liquidity demand: The central question that we study in this framework
is the decision of firms to withstand a liquidity shock in equilibrium. To withstand a
liquidity shock, the firm can renegotiate down debt obligation R1 and lower them by
up to π˜ at t=1 (equivalently, raises up to π˜ from capital markets or draws down a credit
line). However, this is unlikely to be enough to raise enough liquidity to withstand all
shocks because of two frictions, that are well understood in the literature. The first is the
lack of pledgeability of future cash flows due to, for example, moral hazard or lack of
enforcement.
The second is debt rigidity which plays a crucial role in our comparison of bonds
and bank financing. Following a large temporary cash-flow shock, rather than letting the
firm enter financial distress, it is often in the creditors’ best interest to renegotiate their
claims or let themselves be diluted by the issuance of new claims. However, renegotiation
frictions can create a "debt overhang" problem at the intermediate stage. Indeed, existing
creditors might refuse to be diluted by new issuance or fail to coordinate on a mutually
beneficial renegotiation. This can explain why market debt, which is held by a dispersed
investor base, is more rigid relative to relationship banking (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996).
In the model, that can be formalized as a lower value of π˜ that can be raised at t=1 to
withstand the liquidity shock.11
The shortfall that cannot be covered by π˜ therefore has to be planned in advance,
10Note the difference with solvency concerns in which the present value of all future cash flows is too low
relative to the present value of future debt services.
11Tirole (2010) provides an overview. More explicit microfoundations for π˜ would go as follows. In a
frictionless world, the firm could raise at t=1 the entire present value of its future income. However, assume
that only a fraction 1 − θ can be pledged to investors, for example to preserve the insiders’ incentives to
work. Moreover, because of imperfect renegotiation only a fraction 1 − φ of pledgeable income can in fact
be raised. This leads to π˜ = (1 − θ)(1 − φ)× future income. The coefficients (θ, φ) measure the magnitude
of these two frictions.
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and comes from the liquidity hoarded at t=0. In practice, liquid assets can come in the
form of cash, marketable securities like bonds, or access to credit lines granted by banks.
Optimally the firm will not withstand all liquidity shocks. We will see that hoarding
liquidity is costly and hence the firm will sometimes incur a dead-weight loss. The firm’s
"continuation policy" is to choose a threshold π∗ such that it withstand the liquidity shock
at t=1 only if interim cash-flows are large enough: π1 > π∗. The probability of a credit
event is thus F (π∗). Because the firm can only raise at most π˜ from renegotiating its debt
at t=1, it must accumulate liquidity at t=0 of at leastL = R1−π∗−π˜. When π1 > R1−L∗, the
firm does not renegotiate. For intermediate cash-flow realizations, it raises just enough
funds by renegotiating and its payoff is zero. Denote by q the price of hoarding liquid
assets, in the sense that ensuring 1 unit of liquidity at t=1 implies spending (1 + q) at t=0.
This direct price can correspond to a "liquidity premium" on near-money assets (Nagel,
2016) or can be ametaphor for the risk that a credit line is revoked at a later date (Acharya,
Almeida, Ippolito, and Perez-Orive, 2018).
Equilibrium Liquidity Demand and Investment: At t=0, the firm decides howmuch
to invest in the new project. The legacy project implies disposable income y0 at t=0 (i.e.
earnings after subtracting debt obligations and maintenance of legacy assets). Disposable
income is either invested in new project I or stored in liquid assets L, such that I + (1 +
q)L = y0. Throughout, we assume that the firm has enough internal funds at t=0 to
not have to borrow in order to finance the new project. While it can straightforwardly
be relaxed, this is the most empirically relevant case for large firms. The firm chooses
its optimal continuation policy π∗ at t=1 jointly with its investment I∗ and liquid asset
holdings L∗ at t=0. It maximizes its expected payoff given two constraints:
max
pi∗,I∗,L∗
[1− F (π∗)][PV E0 +R(I





(π1 −R1 + L
∗)dF (π)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected profits at t=1
s.t. R1 = π∗ + π˜ + L∗ and I∗ + (1 + q)L∗ = y0.
The first constraint says that there is just enough liquidity at t=1 to service debt in the
worst continuation scenario (π1 = π∗). The second is the accounting of cash-flows at t=0.
The trade-off behind the optimal continuation policy π∗ is intuitive. The FOC implies the
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following optimality condition:
(1 + q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
price of liquid assets
R′(I∗)PV I︸ ︷︷ ︸
return of new project
−




1− F (π∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
hazard rate of credit event
[PV E0 +R(I
∗)PV I]︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss in case of credit event
Decreasing π∗ (withstanding more liquidity shocks) has the benefit of preserving the
returns of the legacy project and the new project, as the shareholders occur a dead-weight
loss after a credit event. However, it necessitates liquidity hoarding, which reduces the
scale of investment of new project. The FOC clearly summarize this intuition: withstand-
ing liquidity shocks has an opportunity cost of investing less in the new project, in addi-
tion to the direct cost q.
Stock Price Reaction to Monetary Policy: Given that firms maximize their equity
value given constraints, the stock price reaction to a change in interest rates can be com-
puted directly using the envelope theorem:
dEquity
drf










− (1− F (π∗))R′(I∗)PV I︸ ︷︷ ︸











change in price of liquid assets

 (1)
The first term reflects equity duration. The second term reveals how monetary policy
affects constraints—here, the liquidity constraint faced by the firm. We break it down
into three interpretable components. The interest rate pass-through captures how much
rate hikes increase debt burden at the intermediate stage. This tightens constraints be-
cause a rate hike drains the cash-flow and makes it less likely that the firm withstands a
temporary shock, keeping its policy unchanged. Second, the cost of holding liquid assets
can rise, as emphasized by recent work in monetary economics (Rocheteau, Wright, and
Zhang, 2018; Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2018; Nagel, 2016).12 This tightens constraints
12Numerous mechanisms have been proposed, such as the change in the opportunity cost of near-money
assets or the change in supply of public money through open market operations. Moreover, in practice
private money creation by the financial sector is also important: many firms use credit lines granted by
banks to insure against future liquidity shocks or hold bank debt directly. A tightening of monetary policy
13
because a given budget spend on liquid assets at t=0 delivers less liquidity buffer at t=1.
Finally, we dub the third term "shadow value of liquidity" (SVL) as it represents the
Lagrange multiplier on the liquidity constraint. The SVL is defined as the marginal value
of an additional dollar of disposable income at t=0. Importantly, in equilibrium, it is
equal to the risk-adjusted return on the new project. That’s intuitive: the new project is
the opportunity cost of every dollar of liquidity hoarded at t=0. In equilibrium, firms that
face greater liquidity risk have a larger shadow value of liquidity. Indeed, they invest less
and, due to decreasing returns to scale, have higher marginal return on investment.
The Role of Debt Structure: This decomposition makes it clear that debt structure
matters for stock market response but that the sign of the total effect is ambiguous. On the
one hand, more bonds imply lower equity duration and lower interest-rate pass-through,
everything else equal. On the other hand, the rigidity of bonds constrains investment
and implies a larger shadow value of liquidity in equilibrium. In general, which effect
dominates depends on details of the environment. Our empirical analysis will compare
the Eurozone with the United States.
3 Empirical Results
The main focus of our empirical analysis is on conventional monetary policy between
2001 and 2007. The scope is dictated by three considerations: (i) availability of identified
monetary policy shocks at high-frequency; (ii) the introduction of the Euro13; and (iii) the
availability of high quality capital structure data. The period covers a full monetary cycle
in both economic regions, as can be seen in Figure 2.
can also reduce private money creation, leading to a fall in the aggregate supply of liquid assets. The slope
∂q/∂rf represent the total sum of these different channels.
13The Euro was formally introduced on 01/01/1999 which locked all national currencies at a fixed rate
to the Euro. Contemporaneously, the ECB started to set its target rate. The initial period was associated
with great operational and policy uncertainty as reflected by the ECB’s decision to narrow the corridor of
its main refinancing rate. For this reason, we allow for some phasing in. The end of the sample period,
July 2007, is dictated by OIS swap rate becoming increasingly uninformative about monetary policy with
the onset of the financial crisis. For a discussion of monetary transmission below the zero lower bound, see
Heider, Saidi, and Schepens (2019).
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3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
Construction ofmonetary shocks: In the Eurozonewe followCorsetti, Duarte, andMann
(2018) and construct a time series of monetary policy shocks using quasi-intraday data on
overnight interest swaps (OIS swaps). OIS swaps exchange the overnight rate, EONIA14,
against a fixed rate for an agreed period. At the point of contracting, the fixed rate rep-
resents the geometric average of the expected overnight rate over the contract period. In
other words, the fixed rate is the average of the rate at the short end of the yield curve—
the primary instrument for conventional monetary policy. OIS swaps represent an attrac-
tive alternative to futures on the overnight rate which are commonly used in the U.S. for
high-frequency identification of monetary policy. Lloyd (2017) finds that the OIS swap
rates accurately measure expectations of future short-term interest rates at a horizon be-
tween 1 and 24 months in the Eurozone until 09/2007.15 Following Corsetti, Duarte, and
Mann (2018), we exploit the closing times of the Tokyo and London stock exchange to
obtain changes in the OIS swap rate in a narrow time frame around the monetary policy
announcement. Specifically, we construct the monetary policy shock as the difference in
the fixed rate of the 1-month OIS swap in the 6 hour (13.00–19.00 CET) window surround-
ing the ECB monetary policy announcement. Using this procedure, a positive shock cor-
responds to a surprise increase, i.e., a monetary tightening. Closing data from the Tokyo
and London stock exchange are obtained via Bloomberg.
In the U.S. we obtain the shock series from the replication files of Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018a)—this series is derived from the change of federal funds futures rates in
a tight window around the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcement.16
Table 1 tabulates the summary statistics of the shocks. The properties of the identified
monetary policy shock in the Eurozone are comparable with those of the better known
shock in the U.S. Across the two samples many shocks are a few basis points and the
mean absolute value is 2.2 and 2.4 bps in the Eurozone and U.S., respectively 17. The sum-
14This is the counterpart to the effective federal funds rate in the U.S. Note also that the ECB target rate
and the EONIA have historically tracked each other closely as the ECB target rate can be understood as the
target that is intended to be implemented by open market operations.
15The Eurozone money market underwent significant stress post 09/2007; we have chosen the sample
period such that the identified monetary shocks are unaffected by this.
16In contrast to the seminal work of Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005b), Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018a) use only regularly scheduled FOMC meetings and focus on changes in a tight time win-
dow around the announcement instead of daily changes.
17To validate the economic significance of our shock for firms, we show that it significantly impacts stock
mary statistics suggest that monetary policy announcements were largely anticipated by
the market. On the other hand, there were a significant number of occasions when the an-
nouncement contained unexpected information. Some of these shocks had a magnitude
of ten to twenty basis points, which is large given that rate changes are typically twenty
five basis points, and are concentrated in the first half of the sample. The shock of forty
basis points on September 17, 2001, (following the September 11, 2001, attack) constitutes
an outlier in the Eurozone. While there is reason to believe that this was a genuine mone-
tary shock in Europe, our results are robust to excluding this particular day. As there is no
established shock in the Eurozone, we confirm the robustness of our result with respect
to other definitions of monetary shocks, such as, daily differences in the EURIBOR or OIS
rate.
Firm-level data: We combine different data sources in order to create a panel of firms
during our period of interest. Balance sheet items come from Thomson Reuters World-
scope and stock information from Datastream. Information on bond issuance comes from
SDC Platinum. An alternative to the balance sheet information from Worldscope is the
Capital IQ database. Capital IQ contains more granular information regarding the debt
structure of firms than what is present in Worldscope.18 One drawback of Capital IQ is
that it gained increasing popularity more recently which makes its coverage limited and
somewhat unreliable towards the beginning of our sample. We use it primarily as an ad-
ditional source to validate the construction of some of the debt variables.19 The proxy for
equity duration follows closely the one used in Gormsen and Lazarus (2019). The authors
show that equity duration is analytically related to the growth rate in earnings per share
in the special case of the Gordon growth model. Analogously to Gormsen and Lazarus
(2019), we use analyst forecasts for long term growth (LTG) of earnings per share from
IBES for those firm- year observations for which the measure is available; we impute the
remainder by a linear prediction that uses the duration measure of Weber (2018), return
markets. We run daily regressions of different stock market indices on our monetary shock series. Table 2
shows evidence at the aggregate stock market level. Overall, Eurozone and national indices react strongly
to surprise monetary announcements. In the U.S. this confirms the results of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005a)
with a different set of shocks and a subset of their original sample.
18Note that we cannot measure bank debt directly. For clarity of exposition, we nevertheless refer to non-
bond debt as bank debt. In practice, most non-bond long-term debt issued by corporation is from a bank,
in the forms of credit lines, term loans or capital leases.
19Our measure of bond debt from SDC is over 85% correlated with that of Capital IQ.
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on equity and sales growth as inputs20.
The research design limits our sample to firms with liquid enough stocks—this seems
a reasonable requirement for stock prices to incorporate new information about mone-
tary policy within a day. We thus constrain our analysis on constituents of highly visible
stock market indices with broad coverage. This approach that defines the criterion for
inclusion in the sample has at least two advantages. First, it leads to an unbalanced panel
to automatically account for mergers and acquisition, as well as the rise of new industry
leaders or the demise of former incumbents. Second, the presence in an index ensures
that firms are monitored carefully by analysts and market participants during the day.
For our baseline results we focus on the EURO STOXX sectoral indices and the S&P500
Index in the Eurozone andUS, respectively.21 Proceeding in this way and excluding finan-
cials and utilites, we obtain a sample of 237 and 409 distinct firms in the Eurozone and
U.S., respectively. As further evidence that our firm panels capture the relevant macro
variation, Table 7 and 8 show that we can replicate the aggregate stock market results
in weighted firm-level regressions. Some interesting patterns emerge from the summary
statistics, tabulated in Tables 3 and 4, and the corresponding histograms in Figure 3: (i)
The size distribution between the two samples is very similar; (ii) the median leverage
ratio is 26 % and 24% in the Eurozone and U.S., respectively. (iii) the debt to asset ratio
shows large heterogeneity; ranges from 16% at the 25th percentile to 36% at the 75th per-
centile in Eurozone, and from 15% at the 25th percentile to 33% at the 75th percentile in
the US; (iv) the median bond debt to asset ratio is relatively low at 6% in the Eurozone
and 17% in the U.S. This is a well-documented fact, sometimes referred as a European
"bank bias" (Langfield and Pagano, 2016). The low level persists today in spite of some
recent upward trend and convergence to the United States.22 Institutional and histori-
cal reasons have been put forward to explain those differences; (v) Apart from the level
difference between the Eurozone and the United States, the bond debt-over-debt distribu-
tions show a glaring contrast: the bond debt-over-debt distribution is right skewed in the
20The results are changing only marginally by excluding missing observations or by using the imputed
measure for the entire sample
21Although avoiding injecting researchers’ subjectivity about the sample selection into the analysis is
beneficial, it does not mean that the selection procedure is absolutely free of bias. As an alternative to the
preceding selection based on indices, we selected the top 500 Eurozone firms by market capitalization in
each year. Our findings are robust to this sample alternation and can be requested from the authors.
22Between 2000 and 2016, the share of bond financing for nonfinancial corporations increased from 9 to
17 percent in Europe, versus 19 to 34 percent in the United States (McKinsey, 2018).
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Eurozone whereas left skewed in the United States. In other words, not only have firms
in the United States more bond debt they also tilt their financing mix heavily towards
bond debt. For firms in the Eurozone, in contrast, the 25th percentile is 0% and the 75th
percentile 59%.
3.2 Model Specification and Identification
To understand the heterogeneity of the cross-sectional response and to shed light on the
transmission mechanism, we explore the richness of the micro-data. Specifically, we use
longitudinal data to estimate models of the form:
∆ logPi,t = αi+νt+γ∆MPt×Xi,t+β∆MPt×Durationi,t+δZi,t+η∆MPt×Sectori+ǫi,t (2)
The panel structure allows for a rich set of fixed effects and controls which act as a defense
against confounding factors. We use firm fixed effects, αi, as well as date fixed effects,
νt. We also include time-varying firm level controls, Zi,t, from the balance sheet;23 in
the main specification these encompass cash-over-assets, earnings-over-assets, debt-over-
earnings, fixed assets-over-assets, and log market-to-book ratio. Importantly, we include
interactions of the monetary policy shock with the proxy for equity duration and with
the firm’s sector. Former controls for the "mechanical" revaluation effect with regard to
a change in interest rates and latter controls for sector specific sensitivities of firms to
monetary policy. The interactions of the sector with the monetary policy shock act as
a first defense against unobserved sector specific and time-invariant factors that affect
firms’ response to monetary shocks, such as, a change in consumer demand, labor supply
or exchange rates.
The coefficient of interest is γ as it captures the heterogeneous stock market response
of firms to a monetary policy shock that is related to the firms’ characteristic X . For
γ 6= 0, characteristic X can forecast the cross-sectional response and plausibly has a role
in the transmission channel. Through the lens of our model, as outlined in Section 2.4, γ
identifies the magnitude of the financial friction that is associated with characteristic X .
23We use lagged balance sheet characteristics for two reasons. First, the majority of firms report at the
end of the calendar year. We want analysts and investors to observe the firm’s capital structure before
evaluating the impact of monetary policy on the firm. Second, lagging the controls can alleviate some of
the problems with bad controls as described by Angrist and Pischke (2008).
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Given our set of controls and fixed effects, the coefficient γ is identified from within-day
and within-sector variation. A negative γ implies that firms with larger value of variable
X respond more strongly to a surprise monetary contraction relative to other firms in
their sector (remember that the average effect is negative), over and above the average
response on that particular day.
The key empirical difficulty that researchers face is that the stance of monetary pol-
icy reflects current conditions and/or anticipated developments in the economy. More
precisely, there are two identification challenges.
1. Monetary policy shocks: It is necessary to separate the expected from the unex-
pected stance of monetary policy. The expected component of monetary policy is prob-
lematic as it is correlated with many third factors driving firms’ decisions. To address
this issue, we use asset price changes in a tight window around the monetary policy an-
nouncement of the Federal Reserve or ECB. The approach posits that asset prices reflect
all publicly available information before the monetary policy announcement and that the
change in asset prices reflects the newly revealed information. Measuring changes in as-
set prices in a tight window around the policy announcement makes any change likely to
be disproportionately affected by an unexpected change in monetary policy.24
2. Firm heterogeneity: Finally, even with well-identified monetary shocks and a good
firm outcome variable, a firm’s debt structure is not randomly assigned. The decision
to access bond or bank debt is a choice, which leads to a potential identification concern
akin to an omitted variable problem. The question is whether there is a covariate that
both drives debt structure and firm reactions to monetary policy.25
One prominent firm characteristic that comes to mind is total leverage, which is a
strong predictor for bond debt exposure and a likely driver of the response to monetary
policy by firms: leverage increases risk, sensitivity to interest rates and it is elevates real
frictions through debt financing (i.e., debt over-hang). Therefore, we include leverage as
a control in our main specification along with firm fixed effects that absorb time-invariant
firm characteristics. Furthermore, we control for time varying observable balance sheet
characteristics on which firms could select into bond financing, and which have been
24This approach has been used by Cook and Hahn (1989), Kuttner (2001), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005b),
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002), Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a).
25The theoretical literature at the intersection of debt structure andmonetary policy is thin, and, therefore,
provides little definitive guidance.
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found to drive the cross-sectional response to monetary policy in the U.S. (Ozdagli, 2018;
Ottonello and Winberry, 2018; Jeenas, 2018; Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive, 2018).
One might also be concerned about potential transmission channels of monetary pol-
icy that affect firms through consumer demand, labor supply or exchange rate move-
ments. However, those channels are often specific to product type, production technol-
ogy, or market and hence they are likely to vary at the industry level.26 Therefore, we
include interactions of industry fixed effects with monetary policy shocks as controls.
Ultimately, the presented framework does offer some insights into two questions that
may help to "sign the bias":27 (i) which firm characteristics drive the value of debt flexi-
bility? (ii) are these characteristics also related to a firm’s sensitivity to monetary policy?
In our model, the marginal value of increasing debt flexibility can be computed directly
from the envelope theorem. In fact, in our simple model this marginal value is directly
related to the shadow value of liquidity (SVL) described above:
∂Equity
∂π˜
= (1 + q)× SV L− [1− F (π∗ + π˜)]
Consistent with our main argument, the marginal value of debt flexibility is related to
the marginal returns on the initial project, since more rigid debt implies less investment
in favor of hoarding liquid assets. This is a very useful result to discuss the two questions
we are interested in. First, intuitively riskier, cash-poor and less productive firms tend to
invest less, and hence have a higher marginal returns. This implies that they place a larger
value on debt flexibility relative to firms that are safer, cash-rich or more productive.28 To
a first order, this is intuitive andmatchesmany accounts onwhich firms relies on bonds as
opposed to bank loans. Nevertheless, we note that some careful theoretical and empirical
works often argue that the full picture is a little more subtle. Second, there is clearly
a relation between the choice of bank and bond financing and sensitivity to monetary
policy. This is because, through the lens of our model, the shadow value of liquidity
is a key quantity that crucially affects both. This comparative static result suggests that
26Valuation ratios within industry tend to be strongly aligned and industry peers are often used for a
variety of benchmarking exercises.
27A more complete model of equilibrium debt composition is proposed in Crouzet (2014).
28This discussion ignores the fact that the cost of debt flexibility (for instance through intermediation cost
being passes through to higher spread) might vary across firms. In many of the existing models, this cost is
often thought to be relatively stable across firms, such as a constant bond-loan spread (Crouzet, 2014).
bond-dependent firms are selected on characteristics that predict a low shadow value of
liquidity. This in turn should make them less responsive to monetary policy. The model
predicts that the presence of "selection" is likely to result in a positive bias and, hence, the
estimates obtain the interpretation of an upper bound.
3.3 Results: the role of debt structure
We find evidence that debt structure is a strong driver of firms’ response to monetary
policy in the Eurozone but less so in the US.
In the Eurozone firms, with a larger share of bond debt are robustly more affected
by monetary shocks. Table 5, column 1, shows that leverage (measured by debt over
assets) itself has some predictive power. The bonds-over-assets ratio also significantly
increases firms’ sensitivity to interest rate shocks as shown in column 2. The economic
significance of this effect is not trivial: following a 25 basis points increase in interest rates,
firms in the top quartile of the bonds over assets distribution have a 58 basis points lower
stock return relative to firms in the bottom quartile. Column 3 and 4 confirm this result
when estimated non-parametrically, by using a bond outstanding dummy and terciles of
bonds-over-assets, respectively. Importantly, columns 5 and 6 control for the firm’s total
leverage and use levels and terciles of bond debt-over-debt, respectively. In both speci-
fications, the share of debt raised through bonds is strongly significant, for a given level
of indebtedness. Column 7 shows that the effect on bonds-over-assets remains significant
and robust when total leverage is included. Collectively, those results point to the special
role of bond debt in the Eurozone.
In the United States, shown in Table 6, the debt structure of firms seems to have very
limited power to predict the response to monetary policy shocks. In fact, we do not find
the debt structure to interact significantly with the monetary policy shock; despite the
strong negative average response to the monetary policy shock.
Robustness: The results are robust to a variety of model alterations. Tables 9 and 10
show little change when observations are weighted by assets or market capitalization.
Another concern might be that the results are confounded by the credit risk that is cor-
related with the firms’ debt structure. Tables 11 and 12 add interactions of the rating
category with the monetary policy shocks. As the rating coverage in the Eurozone is lim-
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ited we calculate the "distance-to-default" based on the framework by Merton (1974) and
subsequently adopted by, among others, Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012). The "distance-
to-default" is a market based measure of the firms’ likelihood to default in the following
year29; we find our results to be robust to an inclusion of a continuous measure as well
as indicators for each quartile of the distance-to-default measure. We check the robust-
ness of our results also with respect to a single factor model—the CAPM. The results hold
when considering only abnormal returns as shown in Tables 15 and 16. In the Eurozone
we check the robustness with regard to a few additional alternatives: (i) Table 17 uses al-
ternative monetary shocks based on daily changes in the Euribor 1M or the daily changes
of the OIS swap rate; (ii) Table 18 excludes September 17, 2001; (iii) as an alternative to
the preceding sample selection we selected the top 500 firms by market capitalization in
each year. This yields a broader sample with 635 distinct firms. The main results are very
similar in size and significance. We have a slight preference for the sample based on the
EURO STOXX indices as it has a comparable size distribution to the historical constituents
of the S&P 500 index in the United States.
4 Discussion and Implications
4.1 Interpretation of Findings
Eurozone: The finding for European firms is hard to square with the classical bank lend-
ing channel. Irrespective of the exact micro-foundation, this type of explanation would
imply that bond-reliant firms are relatively less responsive, the opposite of what the data
indicates. On the other hand, the evidence is consistent with the broad forces related
to corporate liquidity management. According to this view, banking relationships pro-
vide more implicit insurance against temporary shocks relative to harder-to-renegotiate
bonds. Our findings could be explained by the value of banking relationships: a rate
hike drains future cash-flow and tightens liquidity constraints relatively more for bond-
financed firms. In the language of the framework of Section 2.4, the "shadow value of
liquidity" term seems to dominate for Eurozone firms.
United States: We find no difference in the United States across firms with differ-
29The "distance-to-default" model underwent a few alterations after its initial publication and is nowa-
days better known in its commercial version as KMV model which is used by Moody’s.
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ent debt structure, once we control for equity duration. This is line with the findings of
Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2018) that find that the floating rate channel of mon-
etary policy is only at play for firms that do not hedge their interest rate exposure. Like
in Europe, the evidence speaks against these firms being affected by classical versions of
the bank lending channel. Interestingly, it also suggests that banking relationships do not
relax liquidity constraints for U.S. firms.
4.2 Europe vs. United States: Reconciling the Two Samples
The divergence between the two samples is striking. The framework in Section 2.4 shows
that this is a possibility: the effect of debt structure is ambiguous, with different forces
pushing in different directions. Which force dominates depends on the environment in
which firms operate. In this section, we provide some stylized facts about the difference
between Europe and the United States to try to reconcile the two samples. While we
acknowledge that this additional evidence is only suggestive, it seems plausible that our
findings can be rationalized by differences between the two financial systems.
Indeed, a collection of additional facts suggests that the value-added by banking rela-
tionships relative to market financing is much lower in the United States compared to the
Eurozone. Conceptually, the value of banking relationships is lower when capital markets
are a more reliable source of financing. Note first that the extent to which firms are rated
and the associated public information about the credit profile is significantly different.
The ECB estimates that in 2004 only about 11% of firms with turnover over e50m have an
S&P rating, compared to 92% in the United States.30 The sparseness of public information
makes it difficult for a firm to access capital markets in bad times, which plausibly makes
banking relationships more valuable in Europe.
Second, we also show that rating downgrades have a stronger effect for Eurozone
firms. Figure 5 presents the average stock market response to being downgraded from
investment grade (BBB- and above) to speculative grade (BB+ and below) across the two
regions. The raw data reveals that the difference is large and significant: about five per-
centage points lower in Europe relative to the United States.
Moreover, Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito, and Perez-Orive (2018) show that U.S. firms
30For more on the impact of bond ratings on firms across the two regions, see Von Beschwitz and Howells
(2016).
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with more bonds get liquidity insurance not from a relationship bank, but by signing
credit line agreements that are frequently undrawn. In the language of the framework of
Section 2.4, this pattern would imply that differences in debt structure imply limited dif-
ferences in the shadow value of liquidity in this region. Indeed, in equilibrium firms with
more rigid debt in the form of bonds counteract this rigidity by having more undrawn
lines of credit. Finally, Darmouni (2019) finds little evidence of private information em-
bedded in banking relationships for large U.S. firms.
5 Conclusion
The share of firm financing that comes from bond markets has been growing globally in
the past decade. What does that mean for the transmission of monetary policy through
firms? This paper develops a high-frequency framework to shed light on this question.
We find different results in different financial systems. In the Eurozone, firms with more
bonds are more affected by monetary policy, contrary to the predictions of a classical
bank lending channel. On the other hand, we find no differential effect in the United
States. We present an organizing framework based on corporate liquidity management
that can rationalize these findings.
The overall macroeconomic implications of firms’ debt composition are still insuf-
ficiently understood. This paper provides evidence that sources of external financing
are not unconditionally perfect substitutes and the underlying trade-offs affect the pass-
through of monetary policy. Finally, policy is naturally path-dependent: existing debt
structure is driven by past financing patterns, which are in turn driven by past policies.
After quantitative easing and a long period of low long-term interest rates, a large share
of economy now borrows from the bond market, a trend that influences conventional
interest rate policy going forward.
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Figure 2 – Debt Yields across Monetary Cycle
Note: Eurozone: ECB target rate from: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb _in-
terest_rates/html/index.en.html); average loan rate in the Eurozone from the ECB statistical data warehouse:
https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/ quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=124.MIR.M.U2.B.A2A.J.R.1.2240.EUR.N; and yields to
maturity for bond portfolios with remaining maturity of 5yr and BBB and AA rating from Bloomberg: BFV 5yr
EUR Eurozone Industrial BBB Bond Yield and BFV 5yr EUR Eurozone Industrial AA Bond Yield. US: federals
funds target rate (DFEDTAR) and weighted industrial and industry loans (EEANQ) from FRED. Yields on bond
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Figure 3 – Histograms
Note: Eurozone: The sample is an unbalanced panel of the European firms that are constituents of the EURO STOXX
sectoral indices between 2001 and 2007, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements
days between 2001 and 2007. US: Sample is an unbalanced panel of the firms that are constituents of the S&P500
index between 2001 and 2007, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 53 Federal Reserve announcements
days between 2001 and 2007. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope and bond issuance data comes from SDC
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Figure 4 – Cross-sectional Capital Structure
Note: Eurozone: The sample is an unbalanced panel of the European firms that are constituents of the EURO STOXX
sectoral indices between 2001 and 2007, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements
days between 2001 and 2007. US: Sample is an unbalanced panel of the firms that are constituents of the S&P500
index between 2001 and 2007, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 53 Federal Reserve announcements
days between 2001 and 2007. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope and bond issuance data comes from SDC
















-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5












-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Event time (in days)
(b)
Figure 5 – Rating Downgrade
Note: Sample encompasses all entity ratings from the S&P rating panel available on WRDS. Rating downgrade is
defined as downgrade from investment grade (BBB- and above) to speculative grade (BB+ and below). Stock price
data is obtained from Datastream. Panel (a) plots average raw returns with respect to the event date for the Eurozone
and the US separately. Panel (b) plots the coefficients {δt}
5
t=−5 of the following model (lnPit − lnPi0) ∗ 100 =∑
5
s=−5 γs × Is=t +
∑
5
s=−5 δs × Is=t × IEuropei + ǫit, where t denotes event time and I is the indicator function.
Bars indicate the α = 0.9 confidence intervals.
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N Mean SD Min Max
Panel A: Market Returns (in pp)
MP announcement days
∆MSCIEMU 92 -0.032 1.37 -4.16 3.12
∆ DAX30 92 -0.094 1.68 -4.65 5.08
∆ IBEX35 92 0.040 1.36 -3.78 4.22
∆ CAC40 92 -0.096 1.49 -5.25 3.77
∆ FTSEMIB 92 -0.080 1.31 -3.47 3.28
∆ S&P500 53 0.122 0.96 -2.44 2.13
Other days
∆MSCIEMU 1631 0.004 1.26 -6.53 6.17
∆ DAX30 1631 0.016 1.57 -8.87 7.55
∆ IBEX35 1631 0.028 1.24 -5.99 5.79
∆ CAC40 1631 0.004 1.37 -7.68 7.00
∆ FTSEMIB 1631 0.000 1.20 -7.87 7.63
∆ S&P500 1670 0.004 1.04 -5.05 5.57
Panel B: Shocks (in bps)
MP announcement days
∆ OIS 92 -0.047 5.49 -39.25 15.00
∆ FFR 53 -0.065 4.67 -20.00 12.50
∆ EURIBOR 1M 92 -0.000 5.80 -41.80 15.40
∆ OIS (daily) 92 -0.127 5.30 -37.75 10.00
Other days
∆ OIS 1626 -0.141 2.94 -74.50 20.50
∆ EURIBOR 1M 1631 -0.041 1.30 -11.30 10.80
∆ OIS (daily) 1623 -0.036 1.50 -11.75 15.50
Table 1 – Summary Statistics Returns and Shocks
Note: Summary statistics for the market returns of a broad market index (MSCIEMU), national blue chip indices for
Germany (DAX30), Italy (FTSEMIB), Spain (IBEX35), France (CAC40) in the Eurozone and the S&P500 in the
US. Panel B shows summary statistics for shocks derived from overnights index swaps (OIS) intraday, from federal
funds futures, the daily change in the 1M EURIBOR, and OIS at daily frequency. All summary statistics are for the
sample period January 2001-July 2007.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆MSCIEMU ∆ DAX30 ∆ IBEX35 ∆ CAC40 ∆ FTSEMIB ∆ S&P500
∆ OIS -5.148∗∗ -5.843∗ -5.132∗∗ -5.580∗∗ -1.467
(1.893) (2.625) (1.789) (2.069) (2.041)
∆ FFR -7.466∗∗
(2.274)
R2 0.043 0.036 0.043 0.042 0.004 0.130
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 53
Table 2 – Stock Price Index Reaction to MP Shocks
Note: This table reports regression estimates of daily returns of the market index on the (baseline) monetary policy
shock in the sample period January 2001-July 2007 at monetary policy announcement dates. All variables are ex-
pressed in percentage points. Market regressions use a broad market index (MSCIEMU), national blue chip indices
for Germany (DAX30), Spain (IBEX35), France (CAC40), and Italy (FTSEMIB) in the Eurozone and the S&P500
in the US. The estimated model is ∆Rt = α + β ×MPShockt + ut. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to
heteroskedasticity. +,*,** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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mean p25 p50 p75 count
No bond debt
Assets (in bn) 5.654 1.411 2.798 5.883 4923
Cash over assets 0.0644 0.0197 0.0400 0.0787 4923
Earnings over assets 0.166 0.105 0.145 0.232 4923
Fixed assets over assets 0.238 0.0880 0.193 0.350 4923
Equity duration proxy 12.10 7.460 10.88 16 4923
Market-to-Book 4.303 1.864 3.034 5.413 4923
Debt over earnings 1.434 0.319 1.354 2.546 4923
Earnings over interest expenses 33.76 6.405 11.84 31.03 4923
Debt over assets 0.217 0.0665 0.180 0.308 4923
Debt due within year over debt 0.456 0.210 0.394 0.675 4923
Bond debt over assets 0.00168 0 0 0 4923
Bond debt over debt 0.0215 0 0 0 4923
Low bond debt
Assets (in bn) 20.40 4.130 9.940 19.49 4115
Cash over assets 0.0516 0.0215 0.0369 0.0632 4115
Earnings over assets 0.134 0.0859 0.129 0.178 4115
Fixed assets over assets 0.277 0.115 0.260 0.399 4115
Equity duration proxy 11.03 6.390 10 14.64 4115
Market-to-Book 2.536 1.383 2.113 3.010 4115
Debt over earnings 2.039 1.127 1.811 2.732 4115
Earnings over interest expenses 13.99 6.351 10.24 16.12 4115
Debt over assets 0.231 0.160 0.202 0.302 4115
Debt due within year over debt 0.329 0.171 0.302 0.470 4115
Bond debt over assets 0.0702 0.0389 0.0655 0.105 4115
Bond debt over debt 0.365 0.171 0.336 0.521 4115
High bond debt
Assets (in bn) 28.81 4.811 11.48 37.33 4518
Cash over assets 0.0625 0.0212 0.0373 0.0724 4518
Earnings over assets 0.117 0.0912 0.123 0.159 4518
Fixed assets over assets 0.290 0.153 0.272 0.418 4518
Equity duration proxy 10.70 6 10 13.38 4518
Market-to-Book 2.579 1.243 2.023 3.186 4518
Debt over earnings 2.303 1.899 2.659 3.966 4518
Earnings over interest expenses 9.499 4.587 7.047 11.28 4518
Debt over assets 0.375 0.281 0.348 0.448 4518
Debt due within year over debt 0.246 0.128 0.216 0.338 4518
Bond debt over assets 0.232 0.152 0.206 0.274 4518
Bond debt over debt 0.628 0.473 0.640 0.782 4518
Total
Assets (in bn) 17.85 2.553 6.724 16.35 13556
Cash over assets 0.0599 0.0209 0.0377 0.0710 13556
Earnings over assets 0.140 0.0932 0.132 0.182 13556
Fixed assets over assets 0.267 0.111 0.235 0.393 13556
Equity duration proxy 11.31 6.500 10 15 13556
Market-to-Book 3.192 1.411 2.345 3.731 13556
Debt over earnings 1.907 0.976 1.962 3.063 13556
Earnings over interest expenses 19.67 5.413 9.293 16.11 13556
Debt over assets 0.274 0.163 0.257 0.361 13556
Debt due within year over debt 0.347 0.157 0.288 0.481 13556
Bond debt over assets 0.0991 0 0.0566 0.155 13556
Bond debt over debt 0.328 0 0.267 0.591 13556
Table 3 – Eurozone Firms Balance Sheet Summary Statistics
Note: The table presents summary statistics for an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO
STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days
between 2001 and 2007. The subsamples "No bond debt", "Low bond debt" and "High bond debt" to corresponds to
the terciles of the bonds-over-assets ratio, recalculated every year. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond
issuance data comes from SDC Platinum, and stock market information comes from Datastream.
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mean p25 p50 p75 count
Low bond debt
Assets (in bn) 14.96 2.548 5.857 14.69 5788
Cash over assets 0.166 0.0492 0.115 0.242 5788
Earnings over assets 0.155 0.0997 0.161 0.229 5788
Fixed assets over assets 0.238 0.111 0.183 0.305 5788
Equity duration proxy 15.44 11 15 19 5788
Market-to-Book 4.115 2.206 3.250 5.422 5788
Debt over earnings 1.093 0.217 0.692 1.343 5788
Earnings over interest expenses 40.77 11.07 25.78 56.72 5788
Debt over assets 0.137 0.0503 0.114 0.183 5788
Debt due within year over debt 0.285 0.0225 0.168 0.452 5788
Bond debt over assets 0.0489 0.00113 0.0420 0.0883 5788
Bond debt over debt 0.477 0.00906 0.471 0.878 5788
Medium bond debt
Assets (in bn) 17.60 3.607 7.413 16.72 5731
Cash over assets 0.0937 0.0226 0.0565 0.130 5731
Earnings over assets 0.147 0.103 0.152 0.197 5731
Fixed assets over assets 0.309 0.152 0.253 0.399 5731
Equity duration proxy 12.83 10 12 15 5731
Market-to-Book 3.559 1.952 2.923 4.268 5731
Debt over earnings 1.831 0.995 1.496 2.179 5731
Earnings over interest expenses 13.31 6.584 10.47 16.50 5731
Debt over assets 0.237 0.181 0.225 0.268 5731
Debt due within year over debt 0.158 0.0254 0.105 0.233 5731
Bond debt over assets 0.170 0.145 0.170 0.197 5731
Bond debt over debt 0.769 0.633 0.815 0.955 5731
High bond debt
Assets (in bn) 20.35 3.876 8.196 17.73 5734
Cash over assets 0.0870 0.0174 0.0411 0.109 5734
Earnings over assets 0.143 0.0902 0.141 0.185 5734
Fixed assets over assets 0.348 0.182 0.305 0.516 5734
Equity duration proxy 11.89 9 11 15 5734
Market-to-Book 3.720 1.656 2.731 4.493 5734
Debt over earnings 2.752 1.617 2.398 3.713 5734
Earnings over interest expenses 8.886 3.881 6.347 9.738 5734
Debt over assets 0.372 0.288 0.348 0.429 5734
Debt due within year over debt 0.139 0.0200 0.0903 0.209 5734
Bond debt over assets 0.316 0.254 0.293 0.358 5734
Bond debt over debt 0.865 0.775 0.913 0.980 5734
Total
Assets (in bn) 17.63 3.294 7.214 16.44 17253
Cash over assets 0.116 0.0245 0.0658 0.159 17253
Earnings over assets 0.148 0.0974 0.150 0.204 17253
Fixed assets over assets 0.298 0.142 0.240 0.418 17253
Equity duration proxy 13.40 10 12 15 17253
Market-to-Book 3.799 1.930 2.974 4.665 17253
Debt over earnings 1.889 0.780 1.506 2.504 17253
Earnings over interest expenses 21.05 5.689 10.37 21.68 17253
Debt over assets 0.248 0.152 0.240 0.330 17253
Debt due within year over debt 0.194 0.0225 0.109 0.278 17253
Bond debt over assets 0.178 0.0820 0.170 0.254 17253
Bond debt over debt 0.703 0.552 0.807 0.961 17253
Table 4 – US Firms Balance Sheet Summary Statistics
Note: The table presents summary statistics for an unbalanced panel of the firms that were included in the S&P500 be-
tween 2001 and 2007, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 53 regularly scheduled FOMC announcements
days between 2001 and 2007. The subsamples "Low bond debt", "Medium bond debt" and "High bond debt" corre-
spond to the terciles of the bonds-over-assets ratio, recalculated every year. Balance sheet data comes fromWorldscope,
bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum, and stock market information comes from Datastream.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ OIS × Equity duration proxy -0.126 -0.137 -0.122 -0.124 -0.135 -0.124 -0.137
(0.159) (0.155) (0.156) (0.156) (0.171) (0.160) (0.174)
Equity duration proxy 0.135 0.131 0.163 0.124 0.130 0.131 0.130
(0.506) (0.505) (0.510) (0.505) (0.508) (0.508) (0.505)
∆ OIS × Debt over assets -5.333∗∗ -2.545 -2.856 0.613
(2.277) (2.539) (2.466) (2.140)
Debt over assets -11.13 -10.33 0.985
(31.97) (32.40) (31.75)
∆ OIS × Bond debt over assets -17.08∗∗∗ -17.53∗∗∗
(3.048) (3.265)
Bond debt over assets -31.23 -31.77
(37.50) (38.80)




∆ OIS × Tercile of bond debt over assets -1.193∗∗∗
(0.335)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -4.157
(4.542)
∆ OIS × Bond debt over debt -5.851∗∗∗
(1.702)
Bond debt over debt 0.117
(14.71)
∆ OIS × Tercile of bond debt over debt -1.289∗∗∗
(0.443)
Tercile of bond debt over debt -0.842
(5.158)
R2 0.226 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.227
Date FE X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X X X
Observations 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556
Table 5 – Eurozone Debt Structure and Monetary Policy Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 2 using different measures of bond debt as inter-
acted variable X . The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti, Duarte,
andMann (2018). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX
Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between
2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and
time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over
earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from
Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01
level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ FFR × Equity duration proxy -0.270 -0.266 -0.233 -0.285∗ -0.269 -0.269 -0.269
(0.176) (0.169) (0.167) (0.169) (0.170) (0.171) (0.171)
Equity duration proxy -1.813 -1.780 -1.735 -1.819 -1.822 -1.783 -1.784
(1.381) (1.352) (1.347) (1.376) (1.381) (1.362) (1.352)
∆ FFR × Debt over assets -1.827 -1.852 -1.805 -2.285
(3.098) (3.140) (3.087) (4.291)
Debt over assets 17.69 20.04 3.902
(49.84) (50.43) (48.84)
∆ FFR × Bond debt over assets -0.888 0.701
(2.813) (3.973)
Bond debt over assets 23.61 22.50
(49.03) (51.05)




∆ FFR × Tercile of bond debt over assets -0.649
(0.396)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -0.891
(4.579)
∆ FFR × Bond debt over debt 0.139
(1.195)
Bond debt over debt -2.156
(11.92)
∆ FFR × Tercile of bond debt over debt 0.0773
(0.467)
Tercile of bond debt over debt 2.615
(3.330)
R2 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206
Date FE X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X X X
Observations 17241 17241 17241 17241 17241 17241 17241
Table 6 – US Debt Structure and Monetary Policy Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 2 using different measures of bond debt as in-
teracted variable X . The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP shocks are taken from Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018a). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the American firms that were part of S&P 500
index, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 53 scheduled FOMC meeting announcements days between
2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and
time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over
earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from
Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream.




∆ OIS -1.014 -4.328∗∗ -4.772∗∗∗
(1.581) (1.912) (1.793)
Log assets -10.39 9.870 13.61
(20.52) (29.98) (29.57)
Cash over assets -87.89 -162.2∗∗ -212.5∗
(88.76) (79.29) (118.4)
Earnings over assets -52.87 19.84 -3.452
(78.06) (85.30) (130.2)
Fixed assets over assets -44.62 33.27 -104.8
(80.00) (103.6) (105.8)
Log Market-to-Book 42.84∗ 53.55∗ 46.88
(22.45) (30.89) (35.94)
Debt over earnings 0.0750 0.249 -0.0580
(0.270) (0.555) (0.292)
Earnings over interest expenses -0.0348 -0.144 -0.126
(0.0686) (0.166) (0.199)
R2 0.019 0.039 0.027
Firm FE X X X
Weight – MarketCap Assets
Observations 13868 13868 13868
Table 7 – Average effect of MP Shocks
Note: This table presents estimates of the model ∆ logPi,t = αi + β∆MPt + δZi,t + ǫi,t. The dependent variable
is daily stock return and MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti, Duarte, and Mann (2018). Column 1 uses no
weights, Column 2 weights observations by market capitalization and Column 3 by book assets. The sample consists of
an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding
financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm
fixed effects and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over
assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet
data comes fromWorldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from
Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1,
0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3)
∆ FFR -8.487∗∗∗ -7.604∗∗∗ -9.237∗∗∗
(1.695) (2.084) (1.747)
Log assets -7.707 -8.209 -14.52
(22.23) (26.65) (32.20)
Cash over assets 82.80 32.06 103.6
(84.66) (88.59) (123.4)
Earnings over assets -104.1 -164.4 -99.19
(65.99) (109.3) (109.7)
Fixed assets over assets 146.8∗ 57.33 138.6
(74.17) (67.80) (120.9)
Log Market-to-Book -35.40∗∗ -24.77 -50.57∗∗
(15.43) (18.66) (19.08)
Debt over earnings -0.481 3.635 1.468
(3.498) (3.801) (6.810)
Earnings over interest expenses -0.487∗∗ -0.415∗ -0.530∗∗
(0.205) (0.228) (0.239)
R2 0.063 0.063 0.066
Firm FE X X X
Weight – MarketCap Assets
Observations 17330 17330 17330
Table 8 – Average effect of MP Shocks
Note: This table presents estimates of the model ∆ logPi,t = αi + β∆MPt + δZi,t + ǫi,t. The dependent variable
is daily stock return, and MP shocks are taken from Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a). Column 1 uses no weights,
Column 2 weights observations by market capitalization and Column 3 by book assets. The sample consists of an
unbalanced panel of constituents of the S&P500, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 53 scheduled FOMC
meeting announcements days between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects and time varying firm
controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings
over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond
issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are
double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ OIS × Equity duration proxy -0.179 -0.122 -0.174 -0.142 -0.0231 0.0381 -0.00600 0.0288
(0.149) (0.0931) (0.109) (0.124) (0.238) (0.230) (0.248) (0.244)
Equity duration proxy -0.170 -0.162 -0.131 -0.157 -0.843 -0.852 -0.777 -0.841
(0.760) (0.748) (0.753) (0.723) (1.144) (0.941) (1.137) (1.229)
∆ OIS × Bond debt over assets -18.77∗∗∗ -18.56∗∗
(2.267) (7.533)
Bond debt over assets -13.80 1.049
(29.20) (38.21)
∆ OIS × Tercile of bond debt over assets -2.512∗∗∗ -1.887∗∗∗
(0.511) (0.562)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -3.189 1.442
(4.144) (5.798)
∆ OIS × Bond debt over debt -6.418∗∗∗ -7.018∗
(1.448) (3.537)
Bond debt over debt 10.66 27.79∗
(10.25) (15.80)
∆ OIS × Debt over assets -7.158∗∗ -8.024∗∗∗ -9.657 -12.66∗∗∗
(3.509) (2.967) (7.126) (4.203)
Debt over assets -49.52 -47.19 -113.6∗∗ -108.6∗∗
(37.43) (36.85) (50.33) (47.28)
∆ OIS × Tercile of bond debt over debt -2.033∗∗∗ -1.542∗∗
(0.661) (0.767)
Tercile of bond debt over debt 1.805 8.776
(6.021) (5.423)
R2 0.353 0.353 0.354 0.354 0.352 0.351 0.353 0.352
Date FE X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X X X X
Weight MarketCap MarketCap MarketCap MarketCap Assets Assets Assets Assets
Observations 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556
Table 9 – Eurozone Debt Structure (weighted)
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 2 using different measures of bond debt as interacted variable X , weighing observations by
market capitalization (Columns 1 to 4) or book assets (Columns 5 to 8). The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti,
Duarte, and Mann (2018). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices,
excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects,
sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over
earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from
SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance
at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ FFR × Equity duration proxy -0.156 -0.136 -0.150 -0.143 -0.366 -0.356 -0.370 -0.362
(0.202) (0.203) (0.225) (0.202) (0.226) (0.257) (0.391) (0.275)
Equity duration proxy -1.010 -1.072 -0.981 -0.978 -3.523 -3.946 -3.788 -3.624
(1.553) (1.550) (1.575) (1.542) (2.501) (2.778) (3.016) (2.959)
∆ FFR × Bond debt over assets -3.740 -1.843
(3.953) (5.128)
Bond debt over assets -10.96 69.93
(40.96) (80.18)
∆ FFR × Tercile of bond debt over assets -0.150 0.0375
(0.610) (0.649)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -6.882 -10.35∗
(4.828) (5.951)
∆ FFR × Bond debt over debt -1.039 -1.093
(1.394) (2.200)
Bond debt over debt 3.482 -7.664
(10.50) (8.723)
∆ FFR × Debt over assets -1.578 -1.642 -1.017 -1.182
(2.566) (2.491) (2.991) (3.009)
Debt over assets -10.78 -10.79 81.69 87.91
(46.13) (45.88) (95.11) (98.74)
∆ FFR × Tercile of bond debt over debt -0.230 -0.455
(0.639) (1.178)
Tercile of bond debt over debt 1.173 4.222
(2.950) (3.687)
R2 0.254 0.254 0.254 0.254 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.212
Date FE X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X X X X
Weight MarketCap MarketCap MarketCap MarketCap Assets Assets Assets Assets
Observations 17241 17241 17241 17241 17241 17241 17241 17241
Table 10 – US Debt Structure (weighted)
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 2 using different measures of bond debt as interacted variable X , weighing observations by
market capitalization (Columns 1 to 4) or book assets (Columns 5 to 8). The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP shocks are taken from Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018a). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the American firms that were part of S&P 500 index, excluding financials and utilities. Dates
include 53 scheduled FOMC meeting announcements days between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary
shocks interactions and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings
over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and
stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05,
0.01 level, respectively.
44
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ OIS × Equity duration proxy -0.137 -0.149 -0.146 -0.134
(0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.178)
Equity duration proxy 0.112 0.104 0.109 0.110
(0.509) (0.504) (0.513) (0.510)
Unrated 1.893 -0.855 1.025 0.708
(11.80) (11.80) (11.77) (11.65)
IG below AA 10.62 9.542 10.08 10.29
(8.482) (8.633) (8.632) (8.385)
IG AA and above 1.849 -0.435 0.867 0.878
(13.65) (13.46) (13.91) (13.95)
Unrated ×∆ OIS -2.867 -4.276 -4.396 -4.659
(3.891) (3.528) (3.425) (3.637)
IG below AA ×∆ OIS -4.055 -3.253 -3.590 -3.851
(3.845) (3.564) (3.582) (3.722)
IG AA and above ×∆ OIS -5.122 -5.496 -5.022 -4.968
(3.938) (3.558) (3.431) (3.581)
∆ OIS × Bond debt over assets -19.86∗∗∗
(4.442)
Bond debt over assets -33.86
(36.65)
∆ OIS × Bond debt over debt -6.325∗∗∗
(2.112)
Bond debt over debt -0.515
(14.71)
∆ OIS × Debt over assets -3.569 -3.667
(2.343) (2.333)
Debt over assets -10.87 -10.24
(32.65) (32.29)
∆ OIS × Tercile of bond debt over debt -1.507∗∗
(0.630)
Tercile of bond debt over debt -1.276
(5.069)
R2 0.227 0.228 0.228 0.227
Date FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm controls X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X
Observations 13480 13480 13480 13480
Table 11 – Eurozone Rating Categories and MP Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 2 using different measures of bond debt as in-
teracted variable X , adding interactions with rating categories (High Yield is the excluded category). The dependent
variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti, Duarte, and Mann (2018). The sample
consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices,
excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between 2001 and 2007. Controls in-
clude firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and time varying firm controls
(all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over
interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond is-
suance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are
double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ FFR × Equity duration proxy -0.261 -0.267 -0.270 -0.270
(0.177) (0.192) (0.198) (0.192)
Equity duration proxy -2.028 -2.001 -2.032 -1.999
(1.439) (1.420) (1.423) (1.418)
Unrated -7.792 -6.969 -7.477 -7.236
(13.47) (13.74) (13.85) (13.76)
IG below AA -4.873 -4.064 -4.597 -4.596
(12.77) (12.84) (12.78) (12.70)
IG AA and above -7.221 -6.683 -6.864 -7.336
(17.14) (17.39) (17.11) (17.00)
Unrated ×∆ FFR 0.491 0.470 0.437 0.414
(2.885) (2.875) (2.766) (2.788)
IG below AA ×∆ FFR 0.716 0.698 0.676 0.654
(2.809) (2.807) (2.822) (2.826)
IG AA and above ×∆ FFR 0.0705 0.0342 -0.0546 -0.0534
(3.592) (3.637) (3.493) (3.602)
∆ FFR × Bond debt over assets -0.985
(2.956)
Bond debt over assets 19.63
(48.42)
∆ FFR × Bond debt over debt 0.112
(1.227)
Bond debt over debt -1.674
(11.94)
∆ FFR × Debt over assets -1.906 -1.879
(3.667) (3.621)
Debt over assets 8.785 11.64
(48.08) (48.49)
∆ FFR × Tercile of bond debt over debt 0.0548
(0.506)
Tercile of bond debt over debt 2.617
(3.357)
R2 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206
Date FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm controls X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X
Observations 17233 17233 17233 17233
Table 12 – US Rating Categories and MP Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 2 using different measures of bond debt as in-
teracted variable X , adding interactions with rating categories (High Yield is the excluded category). The dependent
variable is daily stock return, and MP shocks are taken from Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a). The sample consists
of an unbalanced panel of the American firms that were part of S&P 500 index, excluding financials and utilities.
Dates include 53 scheduled FOMC meeting announcements days between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm
fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and time varying firm controls (all lagged to
preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses,
fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes
from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at
the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ OIS × Equity duration proxy -0.144 -0.135 -0.131 -0.123
(0.168) (0.159) (0.166) (0.168)
Equity duration proxy 0.178 0.177 0.170 0.183
(0.538) (0.535) (0.537) (0.535)
∆ OIS × Bond debt over assets -17.04∗∗∗ -15.33∗∗∗
(2.782) (3.100)
∆ OIS × Default probability (KMV) 5.123 5.445
(5.367) (5.476)
Bond debt over assets -32.33 -28.61
(38.08) (37.11)
Default probability (KMV) 32.54 33.89
(32.11) (33.12)
Quartile Default=1 ×∆ OIS 1.144 1.215
(2.162) (2.188)
Quartile Default=2 ×∆ OIS -1.384∗ -1.709∗∗
(0.713) (0.792)
Quartile Default=3 ×∆ OIS -2.139∗∗ -2.569∗∗∗
(0.876) (0.929)
∆ OIS × Tercile of bond debt over assets -1.231∗∗∗ -1.085∗∗∗
(0.300) (0.369)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -4.158 -3.684
(4.677) (4.592)
R2 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.228
Date FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm controls X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X
Observations 13376 13376 13376 13376
Table 13 – Eurozone: Distance-to-Default and Monetary Policy Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 2 using different measures of bond debt as in-
teracted variable X , adding a measure of the default probability. The default probability is derived according to the
“distance-to-default” framework by Merton (1974) and subsequently adopted by, amongst others, Gilchrist and Za-
krajs˘ek (2012). The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti, Duarte,
andMann (2018). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX
Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between
2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and
time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over
earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from
Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01
level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ FFR × Equity duration proxy -0.246 -0.246 -0.266 -0.268
(0.168) (0.163) (0.169) (0.163)
Equity duration proxy -1.262 -1.706 -1.296 -1.760
(1.206) (1.318) (1.213) (1.366)
∆ FFR × Bond debt over assets -0.680 -0.327
(2.880) (2.667)
∆ FFR × Default probability (KMV) -45.36∗∗ -45.25∗∗
(17.09) (17.07)
Bond debt over assets 10.90 20.88
(42.44) (49.69)
Default probability (KMV) -506.4 -508.2
(326.0) (327.8)
Quartile Default=1 ×∆ FFR -1.980 -2.193
(2.060) (2.015)
Quartile Default=2 ×∆ FFR -1.164 -1.148
(0.887) (0.882)
Quartile Default=3 ×∆ FFR -5.675∗∗∗ -5.620∗∗∗
(1.559) (1.505)
∆ FFR × Tercile of bond debt over assets -0.608 -0.606
(0.395) (0.396)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -2.417 -1.318
(4.517) (4.582)
R2 0.213 0.208 0.213 0.208
Date FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm controls X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X
Observations 17016 17016 17016 17016
Table 14 – US: Distance-to-Default and Monetary Policy Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 2 using different measures of bond debt as in-
teracted variable X , adding a measure of the default probability. The default probability is derived according to the
“distance-to-default” framework by Merton (1974) and subsequently adopted by, amongst others, Gilchrist and Za-
krajs˘ek (2012). The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP shocks are taken from Nakamura and Steinsson
(2018a). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the American firms that were part of S&P 500 index, exclud-
ing financials and utilities. Dates include 53 scheduled FOMCmeeting announcements days between 2001 and 2007.
Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and time varying firm
controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings
over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond
issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are
double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ OIS × Equity duration proxy 0.00734 -0.00366 0.0118 0.00901 -0.000575 0.00928 -0.00247
(0.151) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.210) (0.166) (0.202)
Equity duration proxy -0.0158 -0.0212 0.00472 -0.0249 -0.0228 -0.0225 -0.0201
(0.505) (0.504) (0.504) (0.503) (0.506) (0.506) (0.547)
∆ OIS × Debt over assets -6.293∗∗∗ -3.848∗ -3.978∗∗ -1.067
(1.640) (1.977) (1.890) (1.672)
Debt over assets -10.92 -11.63 -7.104
(30.21) (31.09) (31.79)
∆ OIS × Bond debt over assets -16.30∗∗∗ -15.52∗∗∗
(2.628) (3.256)
Bond debt over assets -13.02 -9.339
(31.77) (33.12)




∆ OIS × Tercile of bond debt over assets -1.290∗∗∗
(0.217)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -1.440
(3.765)
∆ OIS × Bond debt over debt -5.189∗∗∗
(1.430)
Bond debt over debt 9.127
(12.44)
∆ OIS × Tercile of bond debt over debt -1.208∗∗∗
(0.357)
Tercile of bond debt over debt 1.817
(4.159)
R2 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.065
Date FE X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X X X
Observations 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556
Table 15 – Eurozone - Abnormal Returns
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 2 using different measures of bond debt as in-
teracted variable X . The dependent variable is abnormal daily stock return with respect to the CAPM where the
market beta is estimated with a one year rolling window. The MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti, Duarte, and
Mann (2018). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX
Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between
2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and
time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over
earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from
Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01
level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ FFR × Equity duration proxy 0.152 0.157 0.177 0.135 0.141 0.145 0.151
(0.121) (0.110) (0.110) (0.107) (0.116) (0.116) (0.142)
Equity duration proxy -0.908 -0.880 -0.887 -0.917 -0.939 -0.908 -0.894
(1.244) (1.208) (1.224) (1.232) (1.245) (1.226) (1.205)
∆ FFR × Debt over assets -4.191 -4.128 -4.257 -4.062
(2.596) (2.673) (2.592) (3.817)
Debt over assets 29.51 29.14 23.40
(50.84) (51.30) (52.38)
∆ FFR × Bond debt over assets -3.052 -0.261
(2.420) (3.699)
Bond debt over assets 19.58 10.11
(49.78) (52.90)




∆ FFR × Tercile of bond debt over assets -1.043∗∗∗
(0.353)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -1.382
(4.832)
∆ FFR × Bond debt over debt -0.923
(0.998)
Bond debt over debt -10.96
(12.40)
∆ FFR × Tercile of bond debt over debt -0.384
(0.357)
Tercile of bond debt over debt -0.455
(3.429)
R2 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
Date FE X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X X X
Observations 17241 17241 17241 17241 17241 17241 17241
Table 16 – US - Abnormal Returns
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 2 using different measures of bond debt as inter-
acted variable X . The dependent variable is abnormal daily stock return with respect to the CAPM where the market
beta is estimated with a one year rolling window. The MP shocks are taken from Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a).
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the American firms that were part of S&P 500 index, excluding fi-
nancials and utilities. Dates include 53 scheduled FOMC meeting announcements days between 2001 and 2007.
Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and time varying firm
controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings
over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond
issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are
double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
50
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MP Shock (EURIBOR) × Equity duration proxy -0.145 -0.133
(0.138) (0.140)
Equity duration proxy 0.151 0.145 0.151 0.146
(0.509) (0.508) (0.507) (0.507)
MP Shock (EURIBOR) × Bond debt over assets -15.17∗∗∗
(2.455)
Bond debt over assets -29.55 -29.17
(36.50) (35.90)
MP Shock (EURIBOR) × Tercile of bond debt over assets -1.099∗∗∗
(0.285)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -4.092 -4.129
(4.543) (4.567)
MP Shock (OIS daily) × Equity duration proxy -0.211 -0.201
(0.135) (0.136)
MP Shock (OIS daily) × Bond debt over assets -14.52∗∗∗
(3.660)
MP Shock (OIS daily) × Tercile of bond debt over assets -0.910∗∗
(0.412)
R2 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.227
Date FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm controls X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X
Observations 13556 13556 13556 13556
Table 17 – Eurozone Other MP Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 2 using different measures of bond debt as inter-
acted variable X , using alternative measures of monetary policy shock. The dependent variable is daily stock return,
and MP Shock are constructed as daily change in EURIBOR 1M contracts (columns 1 and 2) or daily changes in OIS
1M rate (columns 3 and 4). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO
STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days
between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interac-
tions and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets,
debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data
comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from
Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1,
0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ OIS × Equity duration proxy 0.146 0.129 0.142 0.136 0.144 0.130
(0.134) (0.122) (0.126) (0.167) (0.143) (0.151)
Equity duration proxy 0.0224 0.0234 0.0200 0.0209 0.0244 0.0241
(0.498) (0.498) (0.496) (0.501) (0.500) (0.498)
∆ OIS × Debt over assets -7.771∗∗ -5.108 -5.569 -1.123
(3.041) (3.557) (3.429) (3.590)
Debt over assets -9.823 -9.912 -9.458 -0.193
(32.52) (33.37) (32.98) (31.86)
∆ OIS × Bond debt over assets -19.66∗∗∗ -18.85∗∗∗
(3.741) (5.094)
Bond debt over assets -24.09 -24.16
(38.43) (38.48)
∆ OIS × Tercile of bond debt over assets -1.330∗∗
(0.517)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -3.234
(4.553)
∆ OIS × Bond debt over debt -5.890∗∗
(2.778)
Bond debt over debt 3.078
(15.05)
∆ OIS × Tercile of bond debt over debt -1.291
(0.797)
Tercile of bond debt over debt -0.0458
(5.176)
R2 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230
Date FE X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X X
Observations 13428 13428 13428 13428 13428 13428
Table 18 – Eurozone - No Sep 17
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 2 using different measures of bond debt as inter-
acted variable X . The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti, Duarte,
andMann (2018). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX
Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 91 ECB announcements days between
2001 and 2007—excluding September 17, 2001, in comparison to the baseline specification. Controls include firm
fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and time varying firm controls (all lagged to
preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses,
fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes
from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at
the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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